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CRIMINAL LAW
does not adequately address the above problems, the court de-
cided to abandon that standard and start from the beginning.
V. CONCLUSION
Dean represents a new stage in Wisconsin polygraph law.
Stanislawski proved unsatisfactory in dealing with the com-
peting values of reliable probative evidence and the integrity
of the trial process. Other states' procedures do not provide
an adequate replacement. Therefore, Wisconsin must formu-
late a new standard that is equipped to deal with the
problems inherent in polygraph testing. As the Seventh Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals explained in McMorris, for better or
worse, "[s]cientific evidence . ..has become more a part of
the ordinary trial .
JANE C. SCHLICHT
CIVIL RIGHTS - Attorney Malpractice - Public
Defenders Not Liable Under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983.
Polk County v. Dodson, 102 S. Ct. 445 (1981).
The Civil Rights Act of 1871, 42 U.S.C. section 1983, pro-
vides a civil cause of action against "[e]very person who,
under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or
usage, of any State or Territory," deprives another person of
constitutional rights.1 In the last two decades, the number of
actions against public officials to enforce civil rights under
section 1983 has increased dramatically.2 Over the same pe-
riod, the number of state-funded public defender offices has
also increased, primarily in response to United States Su-
preme Court decisions holding that indigents have a constitu-
86. McMorris v. Israel, 643 F.2d 458, 462 (7th Cir. 1981).
1. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976). The statute confers original federal jurisdiction over
the claim.
2. See 90 HARv. L. REV. 1133, 1135-36, 1172 (1977). The increase followed the
Supreme Court decision in Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961), which held that
actions not authorized by a state may nevertheless be under color of state law for
purposes of § 1983, id. at 172, and that plaintiffs suing under § 1983 need not prove
that defendants acted with the intent to deprive a person of a federal right, id. at 187.
See 90 HARv. L. Rav., supra, at 1167-75.
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tional right to counsel during trial and first appeal.' Not sur-
prisingly, then, courts have been faced with the question of
whether public defenders act under color of state law, render-
ing them amenable to suit under section 1983. Resolving a di-
vision in the federal courts of appeals,' the United States Su-
preme Court, in Polk County v. Dodson,5 answered this
question in the negative. In arriving at its decision, the Court
made several significant observations concerning the role of
the state-employed public defenders vis-a-vis the clients and
the state.
I. THE CouRT's DECISION
The respondent, Russell Richard Dodson, was convicted of
robbery in an Iowa state court. Martha Shepard, a public de-
fender employed full-time in the Polk County, Iowa, Offender
Advocate's office, was appointed to represent him on appeal.
Subsequently, she moved for permission to withdraw as coun-
sel and have the appeal dismissed as frivolous. The Iowa Su-
preme Court granted the motion and the appeal was
dismissed.
Dodson then brought an action in federal court under 42
U.S.C. section 1983, naming as defendants Ms. Shepard, Polk
County, the Polk County Offender Advocate and the Polk
County Board of Supervisors.' His complaint alleged that Ms.
Shepard inadequately represented him and that her actions,
especially her motion to withdraw, had, inter alia, deprived
him of his sixth amendment right to counsel.7 Dodson relied
3. See Minns v. Paul, 542 F.2d 899, 901 (4th Cir. 1976). The decisions were
Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) (at trial), and Douglas v. California, 372
U.S. 353 (1963) (first appeal).
4. The Seventh and Eighth Circuits have held that state-employed public defend-
ers do act under color of state law. See Robinson v. Bergstrom, 579 F.2d 401 (7th Cir.
1978); Dodson v. Polk County, 628 F.2d 1104 (8th Cir. 1980). The Fifth and Tenth
Circuits have held that they do not so act. See Slavin v. Curry, 574 F.2d 1256 (5th
Cir. 1978); Espinoza v. Rogers, 470 F.2d 1174 (10th Cir. 1972). The Third and Ninth
Circuits have supported the latter position in dicta by holding that public defenders
are absolutely immune from suit under § 1983. See Brown v. Joseph, 463 F.2d 1046
(3d Cir. 1972); Miller v. Barilla, 549 F.2d 648 (9th Cir. 1977).
5. 102 S. Ct. 445 (1981).
6. Dodson v. Polk County, 483 F. Supp. 347 (S.D. Iowa 1979).
7. In Whitmore v. State, 56 Wis. 2d 706, 203 N.W.2d 56 (1973), the Wisconsin
Supreme Court, per Justice Heffernan, stated:
[I]t is apparent that the duties of trial counsel should not cease until the deci-
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upon Shepard's employment by the county to establish that
she acted under color of state law, a jurisdictional requisite for
a section 1983 action. Dodson also alleged that the Offender
Advocate and Board of Supervisors had established rules and
procedures that Shepard was bound to follow in handling
criminal appeals.
The district court dismissed Dodson's claims against Shep-
ard, reasoning that she did not act under color of state law
since a public defender owes a duty of undivided loyalty to
her client, and therefore cannot be sued as an agent of the
state.8 The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reversed,'
holding that Shepard acted under color of state law because
she was an employee of the county, which is "merely a crea-
ture of the State."10 In Polk County v. Dodson, the United
States Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals and held
that a public defender does not act under color of state law
when performing a lawyer's traditional function as counsel to
an indigent defendant in a state criminal proceeding.1
sion is made by the defendant and his counsel whether to appeal immediately
or undertake any postconviction motions that may be desirable. It is the obli-
gation of trial counsel to continue his representation of the defendant during
this stage of the proceedings and assist the defendant in making a reasonable
decision. He has the duty to explain in detail to the defendant the relative
advantages or disadvantages of any projected appeal or postconviction mo-
tions. The decision, of course, must be the defendant's own.
Id. at 719, 203 N.W.2d at 63.
Earlier, however, in Cleghorn v. State, 55 Wis. 2d 466, 198 N.W.2d 577 (1972), the
Wisconsin Supreme Court, per Chief Justice Hallows, also stated:
While an indigent defendant has a constitutional right to assistance of counsel,
he has no right to require an advocate to violate his professional and personal
integrity and oath of office by advancing arguments which he does not honestly
believe have any merit. Counsel does not need to stultify himself by arguing
hopeless and nonmeritorious appeals.
Id. at 476, 198 N.W.2d at 582.
8. 483 F. Supp. at 349-50. The claims against the other defendants were also
dismissed.
9. Dodson v. Polk County, 628 F.2d 1104 (8th Cir. 1980).
10. Id. at 1106. The court also reinstated the claims against the Offender Advo-
cate and Board of Supervisors, and allowed Dodson an opportunity, on remand, to
state his claim against the county with greater specificity. Id. at 1109.
11. Polk County v. Dodson, 102 S. Ct. at 453. The Supreme Court also dismissed
the claims against the Offender Advocate, Polk County and the Polk County Board of
Supervisors, primarily on the basis that § 1983 will not support a claim based on a
respondeat superior theory of liability. Id. at 454. See also Monell v. Department of
Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978); Schappen, Civil Rights Litigation After Mo-
nell, 79 COLO. L. Rav. 213 (1979).
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II. THE CouRT's ANALYSIS
The test for determining whether a person is acting under
color of state law was succinctly stated by the United States
Supreme Court in United States v. Classic:12 "Misuse of
power, possessed by virtue of state law and made possible
only because the wrongdoer is clothed with the authority of
state law, is action taken 'under color of' state law."18 Several
factors support a finding that public defenders' actions satisfy
the test posed in Classic. Public defender offices are generally
established by state statute.1 4 They fulfill a duty which the
United States Constitution imposes upon the states.15 Public
defenders, as state employees, are paid with state funds and
are subject to state administrative directives that determine
their clients, their caseloads and their facilities.
Justice Powell, however, speaking for the majority in Polk
County, recognized that while a public defender's employ-
ment relationship with the state is "certainly a relevant fac-
tor, we find it insufficient to establish that a public defender
acts under color of state law within the meaning of section
1983."'x Justice Powell drew a sharp distinction between the
role of the public defender and the role of any other public
employee. As a defense attorney, the public defender owes a
duty to serve "the undivided interests of his client,"1 7 not the
interests of the state. The activities of the public defender in-
clude entering pleas, moving to suppress state's evidence, ob-
jecting to evidence at trial, cross-examining state's witnesses
and making closing arguments on behalf of defendants. The
Court found it difficult to detect any color of state law in such
activities, which in fact place the public defender in an inde-
pendent, adversarial role against the State."" Indeed, the
12. 313 U.S. 299 (1941).
13. Id. at 326.
14. See Espinoza v. Rogers, 470 F.2d 1174, 1174 (10th Cir. 1972); Brown v. Jo-
seph, 463 F.2d 1046, 1048 (3d Cir. 1972). The public defender's office in the Polk
County case provides an exception, since it did not exist under the authority of an
Iowa state statute, and was the independent creation of the Polk County Board of
Supervisors. Dodson v. Polk County, 483 F. Supp. 347, 349 n.2 (S.D. Iowa 1979). This
was apparently not a factor in the Supreme Court's decision, however.
15. See cases cited supra note 3.
16. Polk County v. Dodson, 102 S.. Ct. 445, 451 (1981).
17. Id. at 450 (quoting Ferri v. Ackerman, 444 U.S. 193, 204 (1979)).
1S. 102 S. Ct. at 451.
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American Bar Association's Code of Professional Responsibil-
ity mandates that public defenders exercise independent
judgment on behalf of their clients, apart from the influences
of the public defenders' employers. 19 More importantly, the
Court found a constitutional obligation upon the state to re-
spect the professional independence of the public defenders it
employs. In Gideon v. Wainwright," the Court established
the right of state criminal defendants to the "guiding hand of
counsel at every step in the proceedings against [them]." 1
The Polk County Court noted that implicit in the concept of
the "guiding hand" is the assumption that counsel will be free
of state control,22 a factor which militates against a finding
that public defenders act under color of state law.
The Court also refused to differentiate between the role of
public defender and that of privately retained defense coun-
sel. The majority argued that although legislative and admin-
istrative decisions influence the way public defenders work,
neither they nor privately retained counsel, by the nature of
their functions, can be the servants of an administrative
superior.2 3
In a lone but thorough dissent, Justice Blackmun argued
that the public defenders' status as county employees per se
determines that they act under color of state law, notwith-
standing the precise nature of their employment relationship
with the state. Citing Monroe v. Pape,24 Justice Blackmun
noted that the Court has long held that a state official acts
19. "A lawyer shall not permit a pers6n who recommends, employs, or pays him to
render legal services for another to direct or regulate his professional judgment in
rendering such legal services." MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONsmiLrrY DR 5-
107(B) (1977). Ethical Consideration 5-1 explains this Canon:
The professional judgment of a lawyer should be exercised, within the bounds
of the law, solely for the benefit of his client and free of compromising influ-
ences and loyalties. Neither his personal interests, the interests of other clients,
nor the desires of third persons should be permitted to dilute his loyalty to his
client.
MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONsmILrry EC 5-1 (1977) (footnote omitted).
20. 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
21. Id. at 345 (quoting Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 69 (1932)).
22. Polk County v. Dodson, 102 S. Ct. at 452.
23. Id. at 451. Note also the American Bar Association's STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL
JUSTICE 4-3.9 (2d ed. 1980): "Once a lawyer has undertaken the representation of an
accused, the duties and obligations are the same whether the lawyer is privately re-
tained, appointed, or serving in a legal aid or defender program."
24. 365 U.S. 167 (1961).
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under color of state law even when the state does not author-
ize or even know of the official's conduct.2 5 Thus, the lack of
direct state control over the public defenders' activities is ir-
relevant to the issue of whether they act under color of state
law.
Assuming, however, that the degree of state control is rele-
vant to the "color of state law" issue, the dissent additionally
argued that the majority underestimated the control that the
government actually has over the public defenders. Justice
Blackmun noted that the county controls the size of and
funding for the public 'defender's office, which dictates the size
of the public defenders' caseloads.2 6 This in turn has a great
influence on the amount of time the public defenders can
spend with their clients. The public defenders' discretion -
and their ability to provide effective representation - is
therefore influenced by state action to a degree not exper-
ienced by privately retained counsel. It is also likely that pub-
lic defenders must conform to administrative rules aimed di-
rectly at ensuring effective representation. The dissent noted
that while the county may not have directed Dodson's counsel
to withdraw from the case, it doubtless could have prescribed
general guidelines to follow in determining whether an appeal
should be pursued or the case dropped.2 7
The dissent further noted that the state not only deter-
mines the public defender's overall caseload, but assigns the
public defenders to particular clients as well.2 8 A public de-
fender therefore possesses authority to represent a client by
virtue of the state's selection of the attorney. This is in con-
trast to the privately-retained attorney, whose authority to re-
present clients is derived from the client's selection of the at-
torney. Indeed, it was the state's assignment of counsel to
Dodson that enabled Shepard to represent him and thereby
allegedly violate his constitutional rights.
Finally, the dissent refused to subscribe to the majority's
theory that public defenders cannot act under color of state
law because of their ethical obligations to their client.2 9 Jus-
25. Polk County v. Dodson, 102 S. Ct. at 456 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
26. Id. at 457.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 455.
29. See supra text accompanying notes 16-18.
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tice Blackmun argued that state-employed physicians have
ethical obligations to their patients just as the attorneys have
ethical obligations to their clients, and in both cases these ob-
ligations may conflict with state practices and policies.30 Yet,
in Estelle v. Gamble,s1 the Court held that a prison doctor's
substandard care does present a cognizable section 1983
claim. 2 In Justice Blackmun's words, "[t]he Gamble Court
did not find that color of state law evaporated in the face of a
professional's independent ethical obligations. I cannot see
why [the present] case is different."' 3
III. CRITIQUE AND IMPLICATIONS
Justice Blackmun's criticism that the majority opinion
"unduly minimizes the influence that the government actually
has over the public defender""M fails to perceive the true basis
for the Court's decision. The majority argues not so much that
the state does not, but rather that it should not, influence
public defenders' representation of their clients, given the
public defenders' ethical obligations. The majority opinion is
more normatively than empirically based. The Court appears
to fear that respect for the public defenders' professional in-
dependence might be eroded were they deemed to act "under
color of state law." In his brief concurring opinion, Justice
Burger supports this view by noting that:
[I]t is important to emphasize that in providing counsel for
an accused the governmental participation is very limited.
Under Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963), and
Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 (1972), the government
undertakes only to provide a professionally qualified advo-
cate wholly independent of the government. It is the inde-
pendence from governmental control as to how the assigned
task is to be performed that is cruciaL35
While other state-employed professionals doubtless have
ethical obligations to their clients, these will conflict with
state policies and interests only occasionally. In the case of
30. Polk County v. Dodson, 102 S. Ct. at 456.
31. 429 U.S. 97 (1976).
32. Id. at 107.
33. Polk County v. Dodson, 102 S. Ct. at 456.
34. Polk County v. Dodson, 102 S. Ct. at 456-57.
35. Id. at 454 (emphasis added).
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defense attorneys, their very role places them in an adver-
sarial relation to the state, and compels them to act with total
independence. It is difficult to reconcile this role with the view
that the public defenders act under color of state law. To re-
spond by arguing that the public defenders' status as state
employees per se determines that they act under state law
oversimplifies the issue by ignoring the uniqueness of the pub-
lic defenders' adversarial function.
Stating an argument similar to one posed by the dissent,
one commentator has claimed that "[a]n indigent who has
much at stake and who likely has no voice in selecting the
attorney who will represent his interests is justified in viewing
the public defender's power as state power."3 There are two
responses to this argument. First, it is not necessarily true
that defendants will have no voice in the selection of the pub-
lic defenders to represent them. 7 Second, the defendants'
perception of the source of public defenders' power to re-
present them does not determine whether their counsel act
under color of state law. It is the actual source of counsel's
power that influences this issue, and while it is true, as the
dissent states, that "a public defender's power . . . is pos-
sessed by virtue of the State's selection of the [indigent defen-
dant's] attorney,"3 8 this is only a partial explanation. The
public defenders' power to represent the defendants also
stems from their status and role as defense attorneys, a role
which precludes them from acting under color of state law due
to the duty of undivided loyalty they owe their clients.3 9
The Polk County Court did not decide that public defend-
ers never act under color of state law. The Court decided only
that a public defender does not so act when performing a law-
yer's traditional functions as counsel to a defendant in a crim-
inal proceeding.4" A public defender may act under color of
state law when performing certain administrative functions.
36. Note, Liability of Public Defenders Under Section 1983, 92 HRv. L. Rxv.
943, 946-47 (1979) (footnote omitted) (emphasis in original).
37. See, e.g., Harris v. Superior Court, 19 Cal. 3d 786, 567 P.2d 759, 140 Cal. Rptr.
318 (1977) (it is an abuse of sound judicial discretion to deny defendant's choice of
counsel where choice is supported by objective considerations).
38. Polk County v. Dodson, 102 S. Ct. at 455 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
39. See the discussion of the majority opinion, supra Section II.
40. Polk County v. Dodson, 102 S. Ct. at 453.
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For example, in Branti v. Finkel,41 the United States Supreme
Court assumed that a public defender so acted when making
hiring and firing decisions on behalf of the state.42 This result
seems proper insofar as the rationale for concluding that a
public defender does not act under color of state law relates
only to the public defender's role as a lawyer.
It is also important to distinguish the "color of state law"
issue from the "scope of employment" issue related to a re-
spondeat superior claim. 43 The Polk County Court's conclu-
sion that public defenders do not act "under color of state
law" is not tantamount to a conclusion that they act outside
the scope of their employment, insulating the state from
claims of vicarious liability.4" The Court decided only that, as
a purely jurisdictional matter, public defenders are not ame-
nable to suit under section 1983 because they do not act
under color of state law.
Finally, it should be noted that Polk County could be
raised by public defenders in defense of their rejection of
state-imposed case loads and administrative directives. The
Polk County Court evinced an unequivocal desire to preserve
the professional independence of public defenders. Caseload
and administrative directives may constrain this indepen-
dence and adversely affect the quality of services provided to
clients, such as to deny them their sixth amendment right to
effective assistance of counsel.
41. 445 U.S. 507 (1980).
42. The Polk County Court gave the Branti case this interpretation, Polk County
v. Dodson, 102 S. Ct. at 453, apparently because the Branti Court never paused to
consider the "color of state law" issue. Id. at 458.
43. Section 1983 will not support a claim based on a respondeat superior theory
of liability. See Monell v. Department of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 694 n.58 (1978).
44. In Cameron v. City of Milwaukee, 102 Wis. 2d 448, 307 N.W.2d 164 (1981),
the Wisconsin Supreme Court faced the related issue of whether acts "under color of
state law" are limited to acts within the state employee's scope of employment. Chief
Justice Beilfuss responded as follows:
We do not perceive a substantial equation between conduct which is within
the scope of a municipal or state employee's employment and conduct which
may be termed "under color of law." Conduct within the scope of employment
is limited to those acts which by law are attributable to the master or em-
ployer. However, for purposes of § 1983, acts under color of law are not limited
to conduct attributable to the state by virtue of the employer-employee
relationship.




In holding that public defenders do not act under color of
state law when performing the traditional duties of defense
attorneys, the United States Supreme Court, in Polk County
v. Dodson, reaffirmed the professional independence of state-
appointed defense counsel. The Court also effectively insu-
lated public defenders from suit under 42 U.S.C. section
1983. 4
The Polk County Court was wisely cautious about opening
up new avenues through which public defenders can be sued
by disgruntled clients. The public defenders' fear of a section
1983 suit by every dissatisfied client could constrain their
good faith exercise of professional judgment in deciding
whether to pursue frivolous claims or utilize various tactics
and strategies. That fear could also make it difficult to recruit
and hold competent attorneys to represent indigent defen-
dants. Of course, innocent prisoners wrongly incarcerated as
the result of ineffective counsel retain the right to initiate
state or federal habeas corpus proceedings to secure their re-
lease. They may also be able to assert tort claims under state
law, seeking damages for attorney malpractice.
RANDY S. PARLEE
45. The petitioner, Polk County, asked the Court to decide whether public de-
fenders are immune from suit under § 1983. Since the Court held, on the jurisdic-
tional issue, that public defenders do not act under color of state law, the immunity
issue was never reached. Nonetheless, the effect is the same: public defenders, when
acting as defense counsel, cannot be sued under § 1983.
Judges are absolutely immune from suit under § 1983, see Bradley v. Fisher, 13
WaIl. 335 (1872), as are prosecutors, see Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409 (1976).
The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit previously held that pub-
lic defenders are also absolutely immune from suit under § 1983. See Robinson v.
Bergstrom, 579 F.2d 401 (7th Cir. 1978). See also Miller v. Barilla, 549 F.2d 648 (9th
Cir. 1977); Brown v. Joseph, 463 F.2d 1046 (3d Cir. 1972).
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